Closing the Chasm: Al-Fārābī on Islam and Politics by Muftugil, Onur F
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone 
Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 
6-2020 
Closing the Chasm: Al-Fārābī on Islam and Politics 
Onur F. Muftugil 
The Graduate Center, City University of New York 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3839 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 






     
 











A master’s thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Middle Eastern Studies in partial 























Onur Fevzi Muftugil 





Closing the Chasm: Al-Fārābī on Islam and Politics 
by 
Onur Fevzi Muftugil 
 
This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Middle Eastern Studies 
in satisfaction of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts. 
 
__________________  ________________________ 
Date                                                                     Anna Akasoy 
           Thesis Advisor 
 
__________________      ________________________ 





   






Closing the Chasm: Al-Fārābī on Islam and Politics 
by 
Onur Fevzi Muftugil 
Advisor: Anna Akasoy 
Much Islamic history evinces a separation between religious and political registers of 
thought and action. To be sure, these two registers always remained, to some extent, mutually 
intertwined since the origins of Islam. However, in about two hundred years into Islamic history, 
or, in other words, in the 9th century, the political register, based on coercion, began to mark 
itself off from the moral concerns associated with the religious register. Political authority 
acquired an increasingly absolute character. It focused more on ensuring the obedience of its 
subjects than the moral/religious purpose of creating a just society where even the weakest or 
most vulnerable Muslim could expect fair treatment. Religious authority, in turn, developed 
independently of political power and was vested, not in sultans or caliphs, but in scholars of 
Islamic law (fuqahā'). The bifurcation of authority into distinct political and religious registers 
continues to shape political development in the contemporary Islamic world, even though nation 
states have by now mostly supplanted the legislative authority of religious scholars. We observe 
the continuing impact of this bifurcation in the religious/secular divide in the Islamic world. We 
observe it in the bitter estrangement between religious and secular citizens of Muslim nation-
states. This study turns to the political thought of Al-Fārābī (d. 870-950) in its search for 
intellectual foundations for remedying the problems caused by this estrangement. Al-Fārābī 
offers resources, I argue, through which Muslim publics can establish a common ground between 
Islam and politics. This common ground would be the welfare of Muslims, the key purpose of 
both religious law and political governance. Al-Fārābī’s thought allows for the creation of this 
common ground as it tethers political authority to a fusion of theoretical and practical wisdom. 
Al-Fārābī knots together morality, the characteristic concern of religion, and expediency, the 
defining logic of politics. Further, he understands the category of religion as historically evolving 
and changing. It is the task of responsible political leadership, he argues, to steer the evolution of 
religious law in line with changing circumstances. All this prepares fertile intellectual ground for 




      CLOSING THE CHASM: AL-FĀRĀBI ON ISLAM AND POLITICS 
Viewed from a sufficient distance, Islamic political history presents itself as marked by a 
persistent duality. We can articulate this duality around the opposition and, in fact, tension 
between religious and political registers of thought and action. This duality is never strict as 
religious and political registers have always been, to some degree, mutually intertwined in 
Islamic thought. The duality does, however, have a historical basis. In the 9th century, what the 
historian Karen Armstrong has described as an “absolutist monarchy” started to become the 
predominant form of political governance in the lands of Muslims, with the caliph occupying a 
formidable state of exception, a state of unaccountability.1 The caliphs continued to make use of 
religious language in their quest for legitimacy. However, they, in fact, ruled predominantly by a 
political logic; they aimed, above all, to maintain the coercive structure of their agrarian empires. 
Religious authority, in turn, devolved upon scholars of Islamic law (fuqahā'). The scholars of 
Islamic law, standing out by their piety and knowledge of religion, assumed the responsibility to 
guide Muslims in their daily conduct.  
Contemporary discussions in the Islamic world about secularism and the proper role of 
Islam in politics recall aspects of this early bifurcation of authority into religious and political 
registers. Contemporary nation-states are organized differently than pre-modern empires, to be 
sure. However, they manifest a similar tension between religion and politics.2 The citizens of 
these nation states hold different and opposing views in respect to the question how much weight 
religious (Islamic) considerations should have in political life. Some citizens want their rulers to 
give expression to their Islamic faith. Other citizens, in turn, expect the state to hold on to its 
 
1Karen Armstrong, Fields of Blood: Religion and the History of Violence (New York: Anchor Books, 2015), p.193. 
2For the modern and contemporary manifestations of this tension, see Sari Nusseibeh, “Islam: Philosophy and Law-




secularist logic of governance and relegate Islam and the authority of scholars of Islamic law 
strictly to the private sphere.   
One might be tempted to view the separation between religious and political registers of 
thought and action favorably. On this view, the religious sphere, independent from politics, 
would serve as the bulwark of the rule of law.3 Scholars of law would determine whether rulers 
exercise their mandate in accordance with the norms and goals set by Islam. This view would 
pass secularist muster too. Secularists would point to the historical separation between religion 
and politics in Islamic history as an Islamic and hence indigenous precursor to their social vision. 
Some contemporary Muslim secularists, in fact, do so.4 The historical separation between 
religion and politics would thus be made to bring forth an Islamically grounded secularism. This 
indigenous secularism would counter the Islamist attempt to revive in contemporary times 
Prophet Muhammad’s early Islamic polity in which religion and politics were fused.  
I want to take in this study an alternative approach in respect to the separation between 
religious and political registers of thought and action. I want to pursue my conviction that the 
separation between religion and politics is politically problematic.  This separation may have 
some appealing and promising features as briefly sketched above. Ultimately, however, it does 
more harm than good to the intellectual and political horizons of Muslim publics. It deprives 
Muslim publics of a common civic discourse, shared by secularists and those citizens who take 
 
3 For an endorsement of this view, see Noah Feldman, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press,2008). 
4 For an example, see Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naʿim, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shariʿa 
(Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2008). An-Naʿim argues that the historical evolution of 
Islamic law allows for the indigenization of secularism in the Muslim world. The state in Muslim countries, An-
Naʿim thinks, should enforce laws pertaining to fundamental human rights and leave the remaining part of 
legislation to scholars of Islamic law. In some respects, An-Naʿim’s proposal amounts to a moral refinement, in light 
of human rights, of the ongoing regime of hybrid law in many Muslim states where Islamic law continues to operate 
in some areas of life. An-Naʿim believes that Islamic law can influence politics in productive ways granted that it is 




their political bearings from Islam. It conceals the unity between religion and politics which 
consists in an orientation toward common good. It reinforces the reduction of politics to the 
accumulation and enhancement of power. It reinforces the reduction of religion to piety and 
tradition. Consequently, the chasm between secularism and Islamic politics grows to such an 
extent that the possibility of a genuine civic dialogue moves out of reach. 
In its attempt to discover intellectual foundations for closing this chasm, this study turns 
to the political thought of Abū Naṣr al- Fārābī (d. 870-950). Al-Fārābī offers resources through 
which Muslim publics can think anew about religion and politics and recognize their common 
purpose: the welfare of Muslims. Al- Fārābī sets boundaries around politics. Setting moral goals 
before politics, he discounts force as the fount of political authority. Al-Fārābī limits religion too, 
by prioritizing its historical roots and moral concerns over its claim to transcendence. Al-Fārābī’s 
main purpose in all this is to tether political authority to a fusion of theoretical and practical 
wisdom. Under this fusion, theoretical wisdom cannot afford to remain indifferent to the 
seemingly mundane concerns regarding public welfare. Practical wisdom, in turn, cannot afford 
to sideline moral concerns in the name of expediency. Al-Fārābī’s approach then knots together 
morality, the characteristic concern of religion, and expediency, the defining logic of politics. It 
allows us to theorize the question of religion and politics in the Muslim world from a fresh 
perspective. Or so this study will argue. 
What motivates the turn of this study to a pre-modern thinker like al-Fārābī against the 
backdrop of rather modern or contemporary concerns in respect to religion, politics and 
secularism? There are other, more contemporary, resources to which one can turn for a critique 
of secularism, including resources from the West, the bastion of secularism. One can invoke, for 




in a liberal democratic public sphere. Habermas, in a manner that is similar to the spirit of this 
study, seeks to overcome the estrangement between religious and secularist citizens. He calls for 
“joint ventures of translation” that can enrich the political public sphere: religious and secularist 
citizens, in this vision, would translate their public visions into a mutually intelligible language.5 
One can easily imagine these joint ventures of translation taking place in Muslim publics. 
Scholars of Islamic law work are well situated to translate their values to a secular public as they 
have historically operated within a rich and secularly intelligible ethical tradition. However, I 
believe, the project of translation can take us only so far: one must adopt a more ambitious and 
historically deep perspective to bring about the dialogue this study, like the work of Habermas, 
calls for. The need for historical depth especially pertains to the Islamic context. Hence my turn 
to al-Fārābī. Let me elaborate. 
Despite what the Euro-centric linear and developmental secularization narrative might 
suggest, a large section of the world’s population today inhabits countries where religious 
sensibilities and demands are accommodated, whether easily or uneasily. The secular/religious 
divide cuts across the national, ethnic and linguistic unity any given country may exhibit, 
proving to be a resilient marker of difference. Most countries address this divide through hybrid 
or accommodationist strategies: most European countries combine, for example, a weak form of 
religious establishment with a relatively diverse, multi-cultural or multi-religious public life. 
Habermas’ strategy, described above, is a remarkably thoughtful and subtle way of reconciling 
the liberal principle of state neutrality with a recognition of the normative contribution religion 
can make to public life. We observe a hybrid approach in many Muslim countries too. The 
 





constitutions of countries as diverse as Yemen, Egypt, Malaysia, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan Afghanistan 
and Saudi Arabia declare Islam as the basis of their laws, while adopting a relatively secular 
approach to criminal and commercial legislation. Saudi Arabia, for example, has exempted the 
finance, banking and corporate capital sectors from the application of sharīʿa rules. There is, 
furthermore, a trend in the Islamic world that emphasizes the mandate of Supreme Courts to 
declare secular values as harmonious with Islam, leading to the formation of what the scholar of 
comparative law Ran Hirschl calls “constitutional theocracy,” a hybrid regime type in which the 
state expresses its (secular) authority in Islamic terms.6 All this reveals the religious/secular 
divide to be a significant source of contention and conflict regarding political governance, 
making hybrid arrangements appealing for many countries. 
Now, among the countries living through the tensions generated by the religious/secular 
divide, countries in the Muslim world stand out with a distinctive feature. Note well how so 
many Muslim countries continue to make room for Islamic concerns and sensibilities in their 
constitutional and legal practice, even while maintaining a general commitment to secularism. 
The problem of religion and politics is more closely related to the very constitution of polities 
and therefore more vexing in the Muslim world than it is in other places in the world. We can 
recognize this when we ponder the ongoing controversies in Muslim publics over the suitability 
of sharīʿa to modern governance. Note well also the continuing appeal of the early Islamic polity 
to modern Islamic revivalists or Islamists, the fiercest opponents of contemporary secularist 
regimes. The early Islamic polity, the polity of Muhammad and the first four caliphs or, in other 
words, the Islamic polity as it formed before the bifurcation of authority into religious and 
political registers in the way sketched above, appeals to some contemporary Muslims because 
 




some features of this polity accord with modern and democratic sensibilities.7 This is the case 
because as a political form, the early Islamic polity exhibits an anti-patrimonial ethos. It rejects 
despotism and commits to rule of law. Due to its tribal origins in an agriculturally infertile 
territory, it showcases a relatively high degree of political participation in comparison to agrarian 
empires that succeeded it. It continues to remain ripe, therefore, for political revitalization in the 
modern context. All this renders politics in the Muslim world more riveted to past than much 
politics elsewhere.8 This carries implications for the religious/secular divide in the Muslim 
world, rendering a search for historical depth imperative. In addressing this divide, we must open 
the lens of time sufficiently widely, seeking, in Muslim past, intellectually rigorous resources 
that can help us religion and politics in different and more productive ways. The terms of 
contemporary liberal democracy would not adequately meet the demands of this intellectual 
exercise. Hence the turn in this study to al-Fārābī, a thinker from the 9th century. 
In critically addressing the religious/secular divide through al-Fārābī, then, this study 
seeks to emphasize the ideas of common good and welfare as the common denominator of Islam 
and politics. One may deem this effort republican or democratic as the concepts of common good 
and welfare are essential to republicanism and democracy. Being a pre-modern thinker, Al-
Fārābī perhaps cannot help us fully embed democratic values and institutions in the Islamic 
world. Al-Fārābī did not know about parliaments, civil rights and separation of powers. As it will 
become clear in due course, Al-Fārābī meant something very different from modern democracy 
when he wrote about the “democratic city.” He was, furthermore, far removed from modern 
egalitarianism; he believed in the naturally grounded supremacy of the intellectually more 
 
7Michael Cook, Ancient Religions and Modern Politics: The Islamic Case in Comparative Perspective (Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 319. 




competent over intellectually less competent. However, Al-Fārābī can help us, I will insist, think 
about the relationship between Islam and politics beyond the religious/secular divide. He can 
help us, to state the matter differently, to close the chasm, exploited by contemporary anti-
democratic secularist and Islamist parties alike, between Islam and politics. 
The study is organized into four sections. Section I explores, from a conceptual point of 
view, al-Fārābī’s overall philosophical and political vision. It introduces al-Fārābī’s 
understanding of philosophy, religion and political science. It prepares the ground for Section II 
which develops the key argument of the study. The key argument is that al-Fārābī fuses, in his 
concept of political leadership, theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom. The fusion of 
theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom brings about the fusion of truth and expediency as well 
as the fusion of morality and political power. Section II further elaborates this key argument by 
discussing al-Fārābī’s classification of “ignorant cities.” Among the ignorant cities, I pay the 
most attention to the democratic city, as this city would garner the most interest from 
contemporary readers. I explore the reason why al-Fārābī thinks that the democratic city is 
unstable. The democratic city is unstable according to al-Fārābī, I find, because it fails to secure 
responsible political leadership. This implies that we should tread carefully while pursuing a 
contemporary appropriation of al-Fārābī as a democratic resource.    
Section III attends to al-Fārābī’s historical derivation of the concepts of umma and milla. 
The words denoting these concepts can be translated as nation and religion, respectively. 
However, throughout Section III and a few times when it is appropriate in Section IV and 
conclusion, unlike in earlier sections and most of Section IV and the conclusion, I refrain from 
using English translations for these words. This is especially important for the word milla. In 




religion as a historical phenomenon. The argument in Section III is that milla, as al-Fārābī 
understood it, comes into being through time as history advances, language develops, and 
lawgivers articulate their prescriptions through imaginative representations and analogies. Since 
the English word “religion” is deeply entrenched in contemporary debates in Anglophone social 
and political theory, I have decided to use it to set up my overall argument, in sections prior to 
section III, and mostly in section IV and the conclusion. However, I do ask my readers to think 
of religion as milla throughout the presentation of al-Fārābī in this study. Or, at least, I ask my 
readers to set aside, when they read “religion” in al-Fārābī, the commonly established 
associations of the word, associations which relate religion to transcendence, a-historicity and a 
Protestant conception of belief as an internal state. All this is important for the overall argument 
of the study. If religion or, better, milla is historical, it is subject to change as demanded by civic 
concerns or the common good.  
Section IV engages in comparisons between al-Fārābī’s political theory and other 
influential traditions and genres in Islamic and Western political thought. It compares al-Fārābī’s 
political vision to the classical/medieval theory of caliphate and the “mirror for princes” 
literature in the Islamic world. It also briefly points to a comparison between al-Fārābī and the 
civil religion tradition in Western political thinking. Al-Fārābī’s political thought emerges from 
these comparisons in a more favorable light, this section will suggest. Finally, I pursue in Section 
IV the continuing influence of al-Fārābī’s political thinking in the Islamic world. I do so by 
focusing on Nasir al-Din al-Tusi's reception of al-Fārābī’s key political categories. We would be 
wrong, this shows us, to cast al-Fārābī as a marginal figure and underestimate the (promise of) 
his legacy. 




Al-Fārābī’s political thought is marked by a distinctive blend of ancient Greek and 
Islamic traditions of thought. Al-Fārābī drew on Plato and Aristotle to reflect on the best political 
constitution. This required attention to human nature and human condition; the best political 
constitution would be the one with the highest capacity to promote human perfection. This 
entailed a grand political philosophy; simple manuals of statecraft and advice to rulers would not 
adequately address al-Fārābī’s political and philosophical concerns. However, unlike Plato and 
Aristotle, al-Fārābī lived and thought in a milieu shaped by Islam, a monotheistic religion that 
had begun to put down roots in a large territory. This made it imperative to create a new political 
science appropriate to a world shaped by divine revelation.  
It is often the case that a blend of two traditions illuminates otherwise neglected 
dimensions of either or each tradition. Al-Fārābī offers a remarkable example of this 
phenomenon. Standing on the bridge between ancient Greece and Islam, al-Fārābī discovered a 
new way of interpreting Islamic history. As Patricia Crone explains, reading Plato enabled al-
Fārābī to interpret “the Prophet as the law-giver, the Sharīʿa as the law (nāmus) or constitution 
(sīra, siyāsa), the Muslim community as his polity (madīna), and, not least, of the philosophers 
as the true legatees of its founder.”9 Stated otherwise, Al-Fārābī came to regard Prophet 
Muhammad’s activity in Medina as comparable to the ancient Greek practice of founding a 
colony. Like the ancient Greek founder of a colony, al-Fārābī thought, the Prophet had 
established a new polity and a new set of laws. To be sure, by al-Fārābī’s time, the Prophet’s 
early polity had expanded into a large agrarian empire that had mostly abandoned the goal of 
Sharīʿa to create a just society where even the weakest or most vulnerable Muslim could expect 
 
9Patricia Crone, God’s Rule, Government and Islam: Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic Political Thought (New 




fair treatment. Nevertheless, it remained the duty of philosophically inclined Muslims to study 
the ideal and strive to establish norms and institutions that constitute an approximation to it. Or 
so thought al-Fārābī. 
From ancient Greek political philosophy, especially Plato, al-Fārābī adopted a distinct 
vision. Following political theorist Sheldon Wolin, I want to refer to this mode as an 
“architectonic vision.” As explained by Wolin, “an architectonic vision is one wherein the 
political imagination attempts to mold the totality of political phenomena to accord with some 
vision of the Good that lies outside the political order.”10 In the architectonic vision, political 
imagination places the entirety of the political order within a larger overriding whole untainted 
by any corruption, disorder and defect. Stated otherwise, in the architectonic vision, political 
imagination overcomes the limits of ordinary political analysis. It refuses to rest content with 
direct observation of existing power dynamics. It reaches beyond direct observation to fashion a 
graceful and beautiful whole. Al-Fārābī’s treatises range from metaphysics to politics and 
describe the entire human and natural edifice as one such graceful and beautiful whole. 
Al-Fārābī’s architectonic vision brings forth a functionalist approach to political life. It 
presents political life as a system of differentiated roles and functions. Here again Al-Fārābī 
borrows from ancient Greek thought, especially from Plato. As it is well-known, in Plato’s ideal 
city, philosopher-statesmen, auxiliaries and producers form distinct classes with specialized 
rights, duties and contributions to the whole city. Al-Fārābī follows this Platonic thread in 
thinking of political society as the organization of specialized skills—of leadership, guardianship 
 
10Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Expanded Edition (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 




of tradition, military arts and production of goods. This culminates in a functioning system.11 
The point, however, is not only to meet the demands of a system. It is to replicate in society in 
the divinely established and secured Good that exists beyond it. 
Al-Fārābī’s functionalism, one must emphasize, is not mechanical; it instead refers to a 
genuine social harmony obtained among willful agents. Al-Fārābī does not expect from the 
citizens of an ideal political association a soulless performance of prescribed duties. Instead, he 
envisages a political association permeated by love. Consider the following excerpt from al-
Fārābī: 
Some of the parts and ranks of the parts of the city are in concert with others. They are 
bound by love, and they hold together and stay preserved through justice and the actions 
of justice... In this city, love first comes about for the sake of sharing in virtue, and that is 
connected with sharing in opinions and actions. The opinions they ought to share in are 
about three things: the beginning, the end, and what is between the two... [This is] 
followed by the love of some for others... by love that comes about for the sake of the 
useful...by the love that comes about for the sake of pleasure. So by this they are in 
concert and bound.12 
 
Al-Fārābī speaks here of multiple layers of love: love for the sake of the virtuous, the useful and 
the pleasurable. Notably, al-Fārābī finds the origin of love in the sharing of virtue. The sharing of 
virtue “is connected with the sharing in opinions and actions.” Since al-Fārābī refers to opinions 
“about the beginning, the end, and what is between the two,” he likely has in mind the love that 
follows from an agreement on the overriding purpose of life, presumably the purpose that is 
explained in the message of Islam. Finally, al-Fārābī does not discount the importance of what is 
 
11Dimitri Gutas writes: “In al-Farabi every member of a society is by nature predisposed, that is, teleologically pre-
determined, to occupy a particular niche in the social edifice, just as every element in the universe at large is pre-
determined to occupy its niche and perform its function for which it was created. It is for this reason that al-Farabi 
can equate the social unit, the city, to a natural being” (p.278) in Dimitri Gutas, “The Meaning of Madani in al-
Farabi's Political Philosophy,” in Melanges de l’Universite Saint-Joseph, 57 (2004): 259-282. 
12Alfarabi, Selected Aphorisms in Alfarabi, The Political Writings: Selected Aphorisms and Other Texts, (trans.) and 




“useful” and “pleasurable.” Once citizens agree on the Good, he suggests, they can pursue what 
is useful and what is pleasurable with a good conscience. 
How can human beings discover and realize the Good and the love and social harmony to 
which it leads? What, if anything, establishes reliable access to the Good: philosophy or religion? 
On what kind of knowledge does the Lawgiver rest his prescriptions and proscriptions? As an 
initial point of entry into these questions, it is worthwhile to consider al-Fārābī’s definitions of 
philosophy, religion and political science. Consider, first, the distinction al-Fārābī makes 
between philosophy and religion: 
Philosophy gives an account of the ultimate principles (that is, the essence of the first 
principle and the essences of the incorporeal second principles), as they are perceived by 
the intellect. Religion sets forth their images by means of similitudes of them taken from 
corporeal principles and imitates them by their likeness among political offices. It 
imitates the divine acts by means of the function of political offices.13 
 
Religion, then, presents abstract and remote ultimate principles by invoking images and                                        
likenesses taken from the corporeal realm and political world. One may think in this regard of 
the Quran’s portrayal of God as a king, angels as His deputies, unbelief as rebellion, the state of 
the unbeliever as darkness and so on. There is, to be sure, an affinity between religion and 
philosophy: the two modes of inquiry converge upon the same set of truths. Religion, however, 
lacks the certainty and precision of philosophy. It lacks certainty and precision because it 
accommodates the limits of human cognition. This lies in the structure of religion; religion 
essentially renders the philosophical truths grasped by a philosophical intellect in a form in 
which less philosophically proficient individuals can comprehend them.  
 
13Alfarabi, Attainment of Happiness in Alfarabi, Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, (trans.) and (int.) Muhsin Mahdi, 




Religion and philosophy differ in al-Fārābī’s thought in respect to the degree of their 
universality as much as they differ in the manner in which they present the truth. Religion has a 
much more limited purview than philosophy. Al-Fārābī writes that “religion is opinions and 
actions, determined and restricted with stipulations and prescribed for a community by their first 
ruler, who seeks to obtain through their practicing it a specific purpose with respect to them or by 
means of them.”14 Religion is tightly bound, therefore, with the purpose prescribed for a specific 
community. The size of that community varies. Al-Fārābī writes that “[the community] could be 
a tribe, a city or district, a great nation, or many nations.”15 One wonders in response to this 
remark about the kind of community Prophet Muhammad, in al-Fārābī’s judgment, intended to 
(trans)form at different points in his career. One can consider a progression or expansion from 
the tribe of Quraysh to the confederation of tribes in the city of Madina, and then to Arabs or the 
Arab nation(s) in the Hijaz region, and then possibly a future or imagined association of many 
nations, Arab and non-Arab, and, finally, all nations or the entire humanity. Al-Fārābī might 
have recognized limits to this progression. The variety of languages and customs among human 
populations would limit the expansion toward a universal community. However, al-Fārābī does 
seem to allow the possibility of a religion encompassing many nations. One can imagine the 
international reach of religion taking place through conquest, cultural assimilation and political 
deliberation. One can also imagine some divine purpose enabling this reach. 
Where does political science stand in relation to philosophy and religion in al-Fārābī’s 
scheme? Like religion and practical philosophy, political science focuses on actions and ways of 
life through which human beings can flourish. Al-Fārābī writes of political science as follows:  
 
14 Alfarabi, Book of Religion in Alfarabi, Political Writings, p. 93. 




Political science investigates the sorts of voluntary actions and ways of life; the 
dispositions, moral habits, inclinations, and states of character from which those actions 
and ways of life come about; the goals for the sake of which they are performed; how 
they ought to exist in a human being; how to order them in him according to the manner 
they ought to exist in him; and the way to preserve them for him.16 
Compared to religion, political science appears to be more investigative: political science is 
principally a science of investigation. Political science provides an account of how the human 
soul or, in more modern terms, human psyche operates, how human action originates, what 
purposes motivate human conduct, and how the character of citizens can be molded to fit the 
goals of a given regime. One can productively view religion as a subject matter of political 
science. A prudent statesman would make use of religion in realizing his goals for a given 
community. As for the relationship between political science and philosophy, one could think of 
the political science in al-Fārābī’s framework as a branch of (practical) philosophy. Political 
philosophy would investigate the norms of action by which citizens can acquire the necessary 
virtues and live together in a functioning whole. 
SECTION II: AL-FĀRĀBI ON POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: FUSING MORALITY 
AND POWER 
The key to understanding the differences and affinities between philosophy, religion and 
political science and hence unraveling al-Fārābī’s overall scheme lies in the concept of 
leadership. Al-Fārābī envisages most humans as in need of guidance to live properly and achieve 
perfection as a collectivity. He writes that “the innate character of every human being does not 
on its own know happiness or the things that ought to be done; rather, for that, there is need for 
an instructor and a guide.”17 For al-Fārābī, rulers possess the power that establishes and 
preserves the equilibrium of a polity. Prophets and imams possess the same kind of power; the 
 
16 Alfarabi, Enumeration of Sciences in Alfarabi, Political Writings, p. 76. 
17Alfarabi, Political Regime in Alfarabi, The Political Writings, Volume II:” Political Regime” and” Summary of 




religion they establish presupposes the ability to rule. At its base, rulership consists in making 
and enforcing laws that articulate the norms of social organization. Consider, in this regard, the 
following words of al-Fārābī: 
It follows, then, that the idea of Imam, Philosopher, and Legislator is a single idea. 
However, the name philosopher signifies primarily theoretical virtue. But if it be 
determined that the theoretical virtue reach its ultimate perfection in every respect, it 
follows necessarily that he must possess all the other faculties as well. Legislator signifies 
excellence of knowledge concerning the conditions of practical intelligibles, the faculty 
for finding them, and the faculty for bringing them about in nations and cities.18 
 
In the person of the imam, philosopher and legislator, theoretical and practical virtues come 
together to form a single set of abilities.19 There might be differences of emphasis among the 
philosopher, imam and legislator in respect to the degree they exemplify each of the constituent 
parts of that single set; theoretical virtue distinguishes the philosopher, while imagination and 
practical deliberation mark, respectively, the imam and the legislator. However, the ultimate 
perfection of theoretical virtue presupposes a simultaneous excellence in practical reasoning. Al-
Fārābī offers a robust account of leadership then; the true leader, in this account, unites 
theoretical and practical excellence and shows mastery of religion and law alongside philosophy. 
Why is leadership or rulership so central to al-Fārābī’s thought? What special 
characteristics of a good leader make him indispensable to a polity? Al-Fārābī suggests that a 
 
18Alfarabi, Attainment of Happiness in Alfarabi, Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, p. 46. 
19Alfarabi’s commitment to the idea of the prophet-philosopher has been taken by many as an indicator of his Shiite 
identity. Henry Corbin suggests, for example, that Alfarabi was a crypto-Shiite who clothed his Shiite views in 
philosophical language. For a discussion of Corbin’s view, see Joseph Kechichian, “The Second Teacher,” in Gulf 
News, April 18 2013, https://gulfnews.com/general/the-second-teacher-1.1172151. For an alternative to Corbin’s 
view, Kechichian refers to the work of Charles Butterworth. We can also consider here Hans Daiber’s argument that 
Alfarabi was inspired by the writings of Ismaili daʿi Abu Hatim al-Razi, especially his Kitab al-Islah (Book of 
Correction), in developing his main thesis that religion is an imitation of philosophy. See Hans Daiber, “The Ismaili 
Background of Fārābī’s Political Philosophy” in Gottes ist der Orient, Gottes is der Okzident, (ed.) Udo 




good leader models exemplary character and a natural inclination toward virtue. Consider the 
distinction al-Fārābī makes between an ordinary virtuous citizen and the ruler: 
… the self-restrained person and the one who adheres to the nomos lay claim to the virtue 
of struggle. If he lapses as a citizen rather than as ruler, the rulers will set him straight; his 
crime and corruption do not go beyond him. The righteousness of the ruler, however, is 
shared by the inhabitants of his kingdom. So, if he lapses at all, his corruption extends to 
many besides him. His virtues must be natural and be states of character, and a sufficient 
reward for him is what he erects in those whom he sets straight.20 
The virtue of the ruler is critical in this account for three reasons. First, since the ruler is the 
sovereign, there exists no higher authority to “set him straight” if he lapses. Secondly, al-Fārābī 
understands the ruler as the fount of virtue. A political association ruled by a corrupt leader is 
bound to fail. Finally, on a related point, for al-Fārābī, the ruler must regard the moral impact of 
rulership as his reward. The true ruler does not rule for the sake of external rewards. His soul 
possesses a natural, internal momentum that propels him to righteous conduct; there is a 
“sufficient reward for him [in] what he erects in those whom he sets straight.” The ruler, in other 
words, must exemplify the right motivation for virtuous conduct for the entire political 
association. 
Al-Fārābī describes the true ruler, the ruler of the excellent city, in idealized terms. Stated 
otherwise, true rulership in his thought resembles an ideal type. In developing that ideal type, al-
Fārābī likely had in mind remarkable human beings in history. However, he characteristically 
refrains from giving historical examples. At times, in describing the ruler of the excellent city, al-
Fārābī makes use of a religious language invoking a philosophized account of divine revelation. 
He writes that the ruler of the excellent city is “through the emanation from the Active Intellect 
to his Passive Intellect, a wise man and a philosopher and an accomplished thinker who employs 
 




an intellect of divine quality, and through the emanation from the Active Intellect to his faculty 
of representation a visionary prophet.”21  From the Active Intellect, the representative faculty of 
the excellent ruler receives either an actual glimpse or an imitation of forms or key principles of 
the universe. The reception of such knowledge endows the ruler with prophetic abilities. Al-
Fārābī, further, imputes to the ruler of the excellent city the additional abilities of oratory and 
war-making: “He should be a good orator and able to rouse [other people’s] imagination by well-
chosen words...He should in addition be of tough physique in order to shoulder the tasks of 
war.”22 Oratory and the art of waging war assure the ruler’s efficacy in the world. Having all 
these abilities, he becomes “the sovereign of the excellent nation, and the sovereign of the 
universal state.”23 Al-Fārābī’s discussion takes place in obviously theoretical terms as no such 
excellent nation, let alone any universal state, ever existed. Al-Fārābī likely intends to present the 
form or ideal of excellent rulership to which cities and nations should aspire.  
The excellent city may be a remote ideal but Al-Fārābī indicates the ways in which its 
main features can take hold in any given society to a reasonable degree. The ruler of the 
excellent city undertakes the task of fashioning the souls of citizens. The fulfillment of this task 
requires the creation of right influences and a salutary environment through and in which citizens 
can internalize right opinions and virtues. Al-Fārābī refers to two primary methods by which the 
ruler of the excellent city and rulers who follow in his footsteps can pursue this exercise in soul-
craft: instruction and the formation of character. Instruction is a fundamentally theoretical 
enterprise: “to instruct is to introduce the theoretical virtues in nation and cities.”24 The 
 
21Abū Naṣr al- Fārābī, On the Perfect State, (int.), (trans.) and (comm.) by Richard Walzer (Chicago: Great Books of 
the Islamic World and Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 245.  
22 Abū Naṣr al- Fārābī, On the Perfect State, p. 246.  
23 Abū Naṣr al- Fārābī, On the Perfect State, p. 246. 




formation of character, in turn, refers to the “method of introducing the moral virtues and 
practical arts in nation.”25 While instruction proceeds by speech alone, the formation of character 
may proceed by “speech and deed.” In forming the character of citizens, the key is to arouse in 
them “the resolution to do the [right] acts [so that] the states of character and the acts issuing 
from them … come to possess their souls... and [they become] enraptured by them.”26 In the 
formation of character, the emphasis falls upon resolution, affect and action.  
Al-Fārābī mentions persuasion and compulsion as part of instruction and character 
building. Persuasion refers to the attempt to secure, through speech, the assent of citizens to 
norms of righteous conduct. It also refers to the attempt to train some of these citizens in the art 
of practical deliberation and prepare them for rulership in the future. Compulsion, in turn, is “to 
be used with the recalcitrant and the obstinate among those citizens of cities and nations who do 
not rise in favor of what is right willingly and of their own accord or by means of arguments.”27 
All this indicates an expansive realm of public concern in al-Fārābī’s thought; the fundamental 
opinions citizens hold and the states of character they exhibit acquire considerable public 
significance. 
Considering al-Fārābī’s description of the ruler as a legislator, the primary instrument 
through which the ruler inculcates the necessary virtues in the souls of the citizens appears to be 
law. Laws and virtues form a bundle in al-Fārābī’s thought, as they do in ancient Greek thought. 
Feriel Bouhafa argues that Al-Fārābī’s account of laws is beholden to Aristotle’s conception of 
virtue as lying in the mean between two extremes: “Aristotle’s conception of the mean is given 
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26 Alfarabi, Attainment of Happiness in Alfarabi, Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, p. 35. 




concrete ethical content [in Al-Fārābī] by laws understood as measures.”28 Al-Fārābī  indeed 
writes that “virtues are traits of the soul and states intermediate between two traits both of which 
are vices, one of which is greater and the other lesser.”29 Those who enact and enforce laws must 
strive to reach a determination of the mean or intermediate that fits the contingent aspects of 
time, place, person, quality and quantity. They must identify liberality, for example, as distinct 
from and in the mean between the extremes of stinginess and wastefulness. They must identify 
respectfulness as distinct from and in the mean between vainglory and self-abasement. Laws are 
best understood as reminders and reinforcers of the virtues that citizens should aim to internalize, 
in accordance with their circumstances. The leader shows his competence through his ability to 
determine and enforce legal measures. 
I have mentioned that al-Fārābī discusses the excellent city in idealized terms. The same 
idealizing thrust manifest itself, it should be evident from my earlier remarks, in al-Fārābī’s 
account of the true ruler or legislator. One wonders then: How does al-Fārābī view actual or non-
ideal political associations? What can we learn from al-Fārābī’s discussion of “ignorant cities” 
with regard to political leadership and the kind of knowledge, whether theoretical or practical, 
political or religious, that political leadership depends upon?  
Al-Fārābī rests his classification of ignorant cities upon the flawed goals around which 
they are organized. Ignorant cities lack wisdom, the principal element of theoretical knowledge. 
Charles Butterworth writes that al-Fārābī’s fundamental political teaching is that wisdom “allows 
 
28Feriel Bouhafa, “Ethics and Fiqh in al-Fārābī’s Philosophy,” in Philosophy and Jurisprudence in the Islamic 
World, (ed.) Peter Adamson (Berlin, De Gruyter, 2019), 11-27, p. 27. 
 




us to discern the unity in all things and eventually to gain an inkling of what must allow for it.”30 
Knowledge of this essential unity allows thoughtful individuals to “discern the flaws in the goals 
pursued by the citizens of ignorant cities.”31 Ignorant cities substitute a part for the whole, 
mistakenly making that part the organizing principle of the whole and thus creating destructive 
pathologies. 
Al-Fārābī mentions six categories of the ignorant city: the necessary city, the plutocratic 
city, the hedonistic city, the timocratic city, the city of domination and the democratic city. This 
classification rests on the goals that the inhabitants of each kind of city pursue. The necessary 
city seeks the essential means of bodily well-being. The plutocratic city pursues wealth. The 
hedonistic city seeks to obtain sensual and imaginary pleasures. The timocratic city organizes 
itself around honor. The city of domination consists of parties that want to conquer and humiliate 
one another. The democratic city puts above all else the equal right of citizens to do what they 
like. It brings together multiple passions and ways of life. 
There are notable interrelations and overlaps among the different kinds of ignorant city. 
The timocratic city especially brings together elements of other kinds of ignorant city. This is the 
case because honor, the organizing principle of the timocratic city, may originate from other 
motives than a simple desire for honor. One may seek honor through claiming wealth and 
distinguished ancestry. When a city takes wealth as the measure of honor, the timocratic city 
shows aspects of plutocracy. There might be another case in which the ruler seeks honor alone 
for himself but does assist other inhabitants of the city in securing for themselves wealth and 
 
30Charles Butterworth, ”Alfarabi’s Plato: A Tale of Two Cities,” in The Political Identity of the West: Platonism in 
the Dialogue of Cultures, (ed.) Marcel Van Ekeren and Orrin Finn Summerell, Berlin, 55-76, p. 74. 
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pleasure; plutocratic and hedonistic elements would again be subsumed under timocracy in this 
case. If the ruler is honored for serving others, then al-Fārābī calls the city of that ruler “the best 
among the ignorant cities.”32 On the other hand, “if the love of honor in [the timocratic city] 
becomes very excessive, it becomes a city of tyrants and is fit for being transformed into 
becoming a city of domination.”33 The timocratic city occupies, therefore, a critical transitional 
niche. It may stand relatively close to the virtuous city. It may, on the other hand, tend toward 
excess and degenerate into a city of domination. 
The city of domination is a power agon. Its members see the world through the lens of 
raw power. Domination may proceed from various motives according to al-Fārābī: the sheer 
pleasure of physical domination, desire to gain wealth and desire to enslave others. Al-Fārābī 
understands human beings’ desire to deprive their fellow humans of a will or self. He also 
understands the political consequences of this desire. The ruler of the city of domination, the 
most capable dominator, as it were, may be driven to take all social goods to himself or his 
faction at the expense of other factions in the city or his city at the expense of other cities. Al-
Fārābī takes this observation further and emphasizes enslavement as the definitive feature of the 
city of domination. In the city ruled by a tyrant, “the rest of the inhabitants of the city are slaves 
serving that single person in whatever he has a passion for; humiliated and submissive, they 
possess nothing of their own at all.”34 Al-Fārābī’s description of the city of domination is 
remarkably perceptive; it illuminates the possessive and destructive dynamic in political life. In 
writing critically about the city of domination, al-Fārābī reveals his commitment to the value of 
moderation, sharing and mutual respect among the members of a political association. 
 
32 Alfarabi, Political Regime in Alfarabi, Political Writings Vol. II, p.81. 
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Al-Fārābī’s democratic city bears a striking resemblance to the description of democratic 
city that is found in Plato. As Plato, al-Fārābī emphasizes the diversity and permissiveness of the 
democratic city: “thus there arise [among the inhabitants of the democratic city] many moral 
habits, many endeavors, many desires, and taking pleasure in countless things.”35 The democratic 
city, further, attracts desires and energies that other cities have blocked: “Everyone loves it and 
loves to dwell in it, because every human being who has a passion or desire for anything is able 
to gain it in this city. The nations repair to it and dwell in it, so it becomes great beyond 
measure.”36 Attracting residents from every nation, the democratic city tends to expand into a 
multi-national empire; it “comes to be many cities, not distinguished from one another but 
interwoven with another, the parts of one interspersed among the parts of another.”37 This 
appears to be a loosely governed association; citizens of the democratic city refuse to grant 
superiority and authority to one another and their rulers. Ability and virtue, al-Fārābī grants, can 
exist in the democratic city; “there may chance to exist in [the democratic city] wise men, 
rhetoricians, and poets concerned with every type of object. It is possible to glean from it parts of 
the virtuous city, and this is the best that emerges in this city.”38 However, the democratic city 
can generate “the most evil” as much as “the most good.”39 Democratic freedom amplifies 
dangers as much as benefits. 
Al-Fārābī thinks that responsible political leadership is unlikely to establish itself firmly 
in the democratic city. If “the one virtuous in truth” ever “chances to rule” the members of a 
democratic city, “he is soon deposed or killed, or his rulership is disturbed and challenged.”40 
 
35 Alfarabi, Political Regime in Alfarabi, Political Writings Vol. II, p.86. 
36 Alfarabi, Political Regime in Alfarabi, Political Writings Vol. II, p.87. 
37 Alfarabi, Political Regime in Alfarabi, Political Writings Vol. II, p.87. 
38 Alfarabi, Political Regime in Alfarabi, Political Writings Vol. II, p.87. 
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The ruler in a democratic city must give the population what it wants to secure his rule. He must 
set before them their choices and desires. If he does otherwise, popular riots bring his rule to an 
end. The democratic city is, in other words, susceptible to disruption by way of popular riots. On 
the other hand, al-Fārābī does allow for the possibility of a virtuous city emerging from a 
democratic city. Indeed, he argues that “it is more possible and easier for the virtuous cities and 
the rulership of the virtuous to emerge from the necessary and democratic cities than from the 
other [ignorant] cities.”41 The democratic city can give rise to divergent outcomes then. It may 
bring forth virtue inasmuch as instability. 
It is possible that al-Fārābī thought of the city of Baghdad at his time as an example of 
the democratic city.42 Built as an imperial capital by the Abbasid Caliphate, Baghdad had 
enjoyed a diverse, multi-national population, with many citizens, like al-Fārābī himself, flocking 
to it from far-flung lands. However, by the time al-Fārābī developed his political thought, the 
Abbasid Baghdad, despite its intellectual vibrancy, fell into political decline. It began to be split 
into rival factions and overtaken by Turkish and Daylami mercenaries. The Abbasid Baghdad, 
therefore, epitomizes the democratic city which al-Fārābī describes as a weak and permissive 
form of monarchy.43 The contrast with ancient political thought is striking, in this regard. Unlike 
Plato and Aristotle, Al-Fārābī did not experience elections or assemblies of any sort; he only 
knew rule by caliphs, sultans and armies. He thus came to associate democracy with a permissive 
social life, frequent riots and weak military power. Al-Fārābī ultimately disfavored democracy, 
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individuals can thrive in Alfarabi’s democratic city can be taken as evidence that Alfarabi’s thought is sympathetic 
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then, even if, as we saw, he did allow for the possibility of virtue emerging from the midst of 
democratic freedom. 
SECTION III: AL-FĀRĀBI ON THE UMMA AND MILLA 
Al-Fārābī’s political thought evinces a keen historical sensibility. Al-Fārābī understands 
social formations as products of historical evolution. This becomes evident in the way Al-Fārābī 
develops two key concepts: the umma and milla. Al-Fārābī conceives the umma as an association 
based on territory and language, like the modern nation: any given umma occupies a specific 
geographical space where a specific language has come into being.44 The origins of the umma are 
found in the use of language, in other words. As humans communicate their intentions and 
opinions to each other through signs and sounds, al-Fārābī thinks, they form a language 
community. As the scope of signification expands, this community develops the arts of oratory, 
poetry, syllogistic reasoning, writing, grammar and natural science.  
These arts are followed by the science of political affairs. The science of political affairs 
investigates matters based on volition and choice. The investigation initially proceeds through 
dialectical methods. Dialectical methods explore diverse opinions and beliefs. Subsequently, 
demonstrative methods which belong to philosophy and admit of greater certainty are 
established. “After all this,” writes al-Fārābī, “there will be a need for lawgiving to teach the 
multitude those theoretical methods that have been inferred, concluded, and verified using 
demonstration, and those practical matters that have been inferred using the capacity for practical 
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wisdom.”45 The lawgiver, however, does not rely on demonstrative methods; those methods 
would perhaps convince some elite citizens but alienate most human beings. Rather, the lawgiver 
uses imaginative representations. This is the point in the social evolution at which milla comes 
into existence. As I have briefly mentioned above, milla can be roughly translated as religion, 
even though it means much more than belief or faith.46 It refers to lawgiving, a system of belief 
and a set of rules that guide conduct. Milla induces moral behavior by expressing philosophical 
truths in accessible language. Milla refers, then, to the emergence, in history, of a particular 
approximation to fundamental philosophical truths.   
In the progression described by al-Fārābī, then, the umma and its arts and sciences set the 
stage for the emergence, initially, of philosophy and, subsequently, of milla. The importance of 
the umma, however, does not vanish once philosophy and milla come into being a particular 
umma. The umma, in fact, remains as the unifying thread of the entire progression. As Alexander 
Orwin explains, “having ascended from the Umma to philosophy, [al-Fārābī] proceeds to 
gradually return to the umma.”47 The return to the umma is imperative because the philosopher 
“must choose to express his most universal thoughts in the particular language of a given 
umma.”48 The political efficacy of the philosopher presupposes familiarity with the particularity 
of the umma. Philosophy can transcend the umma only in speech, one must always remember. 
 
45Alfarabi, Book of Letters in Medieval Islamic Philosophical Writings, (ed.) Khalidi, p. 19. 
46Milla is, of course, a Quranic term, appearing as milla Ibrāhīm, the ideal and pure ur-religion to which Muhammad 
traced his movement. Jacques Waardenburg suggests that the concept of milla conceives of universality in terms of 
common origins: the universal monotheistic religion is the original religion, from which some religions might then 
deviate and to which other religions, like dīn al-islām in the eyes of Muslims, remain loyal. See Jacques 
Waardenburg, Muslims and Others: Relations in Context (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2003), p.106. Alfarabi’s use of the 
milla appears to be different than from this universal notion. For Alfarabi, milla is historical and particular or 
beholden to a particular language. 
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There are limits to such transcendence in political life, in a world where speech and action are 
knotted together.  
Al-Fārābī further complicates this progression by mentioning three possibilities for the 
historical origin of any given milla.49 These possibilities center on the relationship between 
philosophy and milla. First, a milla may be based on a false philosophy, for example a 
philosophy with Egyptian or Babylonian roots. There might be a second lawgiver, in the same or 
a nearby umma where this milla based on a false philosophy has come into being, in whose time 
true philosophy, meaning Greek philosophy, exists. However, this second lawgiver may 
disregard this true philosophy and choose to rest his religion on the opinions and images of the 
old milla based on a false philosophy. This further corrupts the milla. A third lawgiver, who has 
no access to true philosophy, takes up this existing corrupt religion. This lawgiver addresses a 
new community that lacks even the rudimentary steps toward the demonstrative method of 
philosophy, meaning the steps of sophistry and dialectic. He adapts the already corrupt second 
milla to the needs of this intellectually deficient community, generating a further corrupt milla, 
far removed from true philosophy. The first possibility then appears to be notably bleak. 
Philosophy antedates milla, al-Fārābī had argued in describing the progression from the umma to 
milla through philosophy. However, he demonstrates by invoking this first possibility, that 
history may disrupt and fully cover the close relationship between religion and true philosophy. 
The second possibility assumes a milla based on true philosophy. However, this milla 
spreads into another umma that lacks any cognition of the philosophical origins and 
underpinnings of their newly imported milla. Philosophy may subsequently reach this umma. 
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This allows the philosophically inclined members of the umma to discover the origins of their 
milla in true philosophy. However, these members are likely to be opposed by the conventional 
interpreters of milla. This opposition renders difficult the prospect of cooperation between milla 
and philosophy.  
The third possibility involves an even more disastrous clash between the partisans of 
milla and philosophy. The clash takes place when true philosophy reaches an umma that already 
has a milla based on false philosophy—the philosophy, for example, of Egyptians, Indians, 
Syrians and other neighboring ummas. Proponents of philosophy and milla share no common 
ground in this case; they end up at loggerheads with each other. The fate of the umma depends 
upon the outcome of this struggle between philosophy and milla. 
It is not clear which of the three possibilities applies to Arabs and Islam. Al-Fārābī could 
have taken Islam to be based on true philosophy. This would call to mind the second possibility. 
However, it is not clear how Greek philosophy, which al-Fārābī deemed true philosophy, could 
enter the horizon of Muhammad; Greeks were not among the immediate neighbors of Arabs at 
the birth of Islam. Could al-Fārābī have thought that true, or Greek, philosophy has been 
channeled into Islam through Christianity? That might be the case, though we lack any evidence 
that could justify attributing this view to al-Fārābī with complete confidence. Alternatively, 
could al-Fārābī have thought that Islam is based on a false philosophy, in accordance with the 
first and third possibilities? That would be a rebellious intellectual position. It would invite the 
accusation of heresy. It seems unlikely to me that al-Fārābī held this position; al-Fārābī’s entire 
corpus shows reverence toward Islam. In any case, al-Fārābī offers multiple and mutually 
incompatible accounts regarding the origin of milla. Further, the historical paths al-Fārābī 




philosophy and milla in most ummas. The overall message al-Fārābī forwards, in my view, is 
that milla is a historical phenomenon, even if it may issue from or be assisted by true philosophy 
and divine revelation.    
Whether the origins of any given milla lie in true or false philosophy, milla shapes the 
umma in which it has arisen to a significant degree. It gives birth to the arts of jurisprudence and 
dialectical theology. “The art of jurisprudence,” al-Fārābī writes, “is that by which a human 
being is able to infer, from the things the lawgiver declared specifically and determinately, the 
determination of each of the things he did not specifically declare.”50 The jurist verifies his 
determination “on the basis of the purpose of the lawgiver in the religion he legislated with 
respect to the nation for which it was legislated.”51 The art of jurisprudence ascertains the 
purpose of the lawgiver and makes new laws. “The art of dialectical theology,” on the other 
hand, “is a disposition by which a human being is able to defend the specific opinions and 
actions that the founder of the religion declared and to refute by arguments whatever opposes 
it.”52 The art of dialectical theology sets out to preserve, in other words, the essential opinions 
and actions of a milla.  
Al-Fārābī mentions some dangers that issue from certain ways in which the art of 
dialectical theology may be practiced. Stated otherwise, he subtly alerts his readers to the 
problems posed by an overzealous attachment to a given milla.  Some dialectical theologians, al-
Fārābī writes, were so assured of the validity of their milla that “they were of the opinion that 
they would defend it before others, make it attractive, remove suspicion from it, and ward their 
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adversaries away from it by any chance thing.”53 These “did not care whether they used 
falsehood, deceit, slander, or disdain.”54 They justified the use of these immoral means in the 
following way: Only two kinds of men, they thought, could oppose them: an enemy or someone 
who is ignorant. It was permissible to use falsehood and deceit to defeat an enemy, they 
believed. As for someone who is ignorant, “[they thought it] permissible to bring a human being 
to his good fortune by means of falsehood and deceit, just as that is done with women and 
children.”55 Al-Fārābī appears to be merely reporting the worldview and morality of these 
dialectical theologians; however, he does make it known that he disapproves their worldview and 
morality. In my view, al-Fārābī takes issue with the displacement of moral concerns by a logic 
that divides the world into friends and enemies. He takes issue, furthermore, with the way 
partisans of a milla often cast people who do not share their system of belief as ignorant. A milla 
can exert a pernicious influence in an umma, Al-Fārābī recognizes. Fanatical attachment to a 
milla can lead some to operate by an impoverished political logic. It can lead them to adopt 
immoral maxims of action like “one may treat the enemy or the ignorant as one sees fit” and 
“good ends justify any means that work toward it, good or bad.” 
Al-Fārābī is intent upon securing the primacy and prestige of philosophy in an umma in 
which a milla has come into being. He writes that “the select without qualification are those who 
are philosophers without qualification.”56 Others become select to the degree to which their 
activity bears resemblance to philosophy. A political leader renders himself among the select 
because his art, the practical art, constitutes a part of philosophy. “Only philosophers should be 
taken to be select in the first instance, in point of excellence... followed by dialecticians and the 
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sophists, then the [religious] lawgivers, and finally the theologians and jurists,” al-Fārābī 
insists.57  Al-Fārābī considers lawgivers, theologians and jurists among the select. However, he 
considers them among the select only after philosophers, dialecticians and sophists. Moreover, 
one must remember, for al-Fārābī, the practitioners of the arts and sciences of milla render 
themselves among the select on the condition that they practice their art in a way that resembles 
philosophy. This means that they must demonstrate an ability to think independently, relatively 
free of dogma, to be accounted among the select.  
What does the emergence of a milla imply for political leadership? Do the arts and 
sciences of milla serve to prop up and steer the exercise of political authority? Al-Fārābī does not 
answer these questions directly. There are hints in his texts, however, toward a possible answer. 
In my view, milla assumes considerable political importance when the true king or the ruler of 
the excellent city passes away. Now, it is likely that the true king or the ruler of the excellent city 
is at the same time a prophet. His imaginative evocations give rise to a milla. However, this stage 
corresponds to only the beginnings of a milla. Milla develops further upon the death of its 
founder, the founding prophet or true king. As it develops further, moreover, it helps the umma 
preserve its laws prescribed by the true king. Al-Fārābī, as far as I can tell, understands the 
congealment of the laws of a milla as dependent upon political succession. The process occurs in 
the following way: The successor to the true king, writes al-Fārābī, “will proceed according to 
the way of life of the first.”58 It is permissible, furthermore, for the successor to “change a Law 
[the first ruler] legislated at one moment if he [the successor] is of the opinion that it is more 
fitting to change it at another moment.”59 The succession to the deceased true king gives birth to 
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a new regime then. This regime refers to rule based on the transmission of Laws prescribed or 
ordained by the true king. Al-Fārābī calls the ruler of this regime type “the king of traditional law 
(sunna)”: “So the ruler who governs the city by means of written Laws adopted from past leaders 
is the king of traditional law (sunna).”60 The term sunna (tradition), al-Fārābī declares elsewhere, 
is “almost synonymous” with sharīʿa.61 We are led to the conclusion that the regime ruled by the 
king of traditional law, the regime that succeeds the regime of the excellent ruler or the first 
ruler, is organized around milla. The king of traditional law oversees and enforces the written 
laws of milla. He, furthermore, changes some of these laws if new conditions so demand. 
If the regime succeeding the excellent city is governed by traditional law, we can imagine 
jurists and scholars of sharīʿa (law) coming to possess greater political authority in that regime. 
The making of new laws in that regime would depend on the art of jurisprudence: the art by 
which humans discern the purposes of the original lawgiver and make new legal determinations 
for newly emerging cases and conditions that accord with these purposes. The art of 
jurisprudence would thus become critical, to be sure. However, al-Fārābī clearly posits the 
primacy of political science over (Islamic) jurisprudence. He writes that “jurisprudence about the 
practical matters of religion comprises only things that are particulars of the universals 
encompassed by political science; it is, therefore, a part of political science and subordinate to 
practical philosophy.”62 Jurisprudence is subordinate to political science; it applies the universal 
principles discovered by political science to particular cases. Al-Fārābī attributes therefore the 
authority to oversee legislation to the king of traditional law rather than to jurists. The king of 
traditional law possesses, al-Fārābī must have thought, a keener understanding of how the 
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various purposes of the original lawgiver form a coherent principled ethical system that makes 
for human happiness and perfection. To be sure, jurists and scholars of law make specific 
contributions to the preservation and implementation of this system by mastering the key texts 
and reports in the tradition. Their art and practice, however, are subservient to the art and 
practice of the ruler. 
SECTION IV: AL-FĀRĀBI IN COMPARISON TO OTHER TRADITIONS OF 
POLITICAL THOUGHT 
What comparisons can we draw between al-Fārābī’s political thought and other major 
strands in Islamic political thinking? In particular, how does al-Fārābī’s account of political 
association and leadership stand in relation to the classical theory of caliphate/imamate as it 
historically evolved? As it was theorized by al-Mawardi (d. 972-1058) in the 11th century, the 
classical theory of caliphate/imamate posited a caliph descended from the Quraysh tribe who was 
tasked with the mission of protecting the community of Muslims and administering its affairs on 
the foundation afforded by Islam.63 The caliph, al-Mawardi thought, could delegate his power, 
either in a particular province or the entire territory, to a wazir and emir who held de facto 
power. However, this delegation could only take place in the terms set by the caliph in 
accordance with the sharīʿa. 
By the 14th century, this classical theory evolved in a different direction than the direction 
al-Mawardi intended it to follow. To obtain a sense of this evolution, I suggest turning to Ibn 
Khaldun’s discussion of the subject. Ibn Khaldun (d. 1332-1406), like al-Mawardi, conceives the 
caliphate/imamate as a “substitute for Muhammad inasmuch as it serves, like him, to preserve 
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the religion and to exercise political leadership of the world.”64 He notes, however, that in later 
times, the caliph or the imam has been called ‘the sultan’ and anybody who seized power 
extracted the oath of allegiance from the people. The historical evolution of the classical theory 
of caliphate came to privilege, then, de facto authority over de jure authority. In fact, in 
hindsight, al-Mawardi’s development of the theory in the 11th century appears to be an ultimately 
unsuccessful effort to forestall the trend in the Islamic world toward absolutist monarchy, a trend 
that had begun in the 9th century. Al-Mawardi acknowledged and sought to legally contain that 
trend through his concept of delegation. He was, however, unsuccessful in that effort. Or so it 
seems from Ibn Khaldun’s account. 
In his further discussion of the subject, Ibn Khaldun argues that the institution of 
caliphate/imamate is necessary for rational reasons. In the absence of a ruler who can exert a 
restraining influence, mankind falls into ruin, he suggests. The restraining influence of the ruler 
need not come into existence from religious law; the sheer power of the mighty ruler suffices to 
supply such an influence. Religious law, however, does provide benefits for political rule, argues 
Ibn Khaldun. It reinforces the duty of Muslim political subjects to obey the ruler who is tasked 
with overseeing the imposition of religious law.  
Ibn Khaldun insists that the religious law is not opposed to the authority of kings. He 
writes that “the religious law does not censure royal authority as such and does not forbid its 
exercise.”65 Religious law, he further writes, “merely censures the evils resulting from it, such as 
tyranny, injustice, and pleasure-seeking."66 The institution of the caliphate/imamate, Ibn Khaldun 
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suggests, is indeed governed by essential prerequisites: “knowledge, probity, competence, 
freedom of the senses and limbs from any defect that might affect judgment and action.”67 Not 
everyone deserves to become the caliph. However, Ibn Khaldun fails to indicate any mechanism 
in the religious law by which people can decide that a given ruler has shown himself to be 
lacking these prerequisites, committed injustice and hence forfeited his right to rule. Rather, he 
consistently describes royal authority as the natural consequence of group feeling that is set upon 
conquest. Further, religious law approves, or at least does not censure, this aggressive and 
expansionist group feeling according to Ibn Khaldun. 
How does Al-Fārābī’s political thought differ from the classical theory of caliphate as its 
outline and historical evolution is presented by Ibn Khaldun? Al-Fārābī, as we have seen, refuses 
to confer moral legitimacy on political power obtained through expansionist group-feeling. More 
generally, Al-Fārābī, as we have also seen, refuses to evaluate human affairs through any 
political logic grounded in friend/enemy distinction and violence. For Al-Fārābī, political rule 
finds its origin in and draws its legitimacy from its mandate to regulate human affairs by way of 
laws. It is true that the classical theory of caliphate allows the moral or non-political sphere of 
divine law to restrain political power. However, it posits no reliable mechanism to enforce this 
restraining power. Furthermore, it offers no foundational challenge to the effort to seize political 
power through group-feeling and power. Al-Fārābī’s approach, in contrast, binds political power 
tightly to morality and truth, allowing it no independent claim to authority.  
For another comparison, we can consider the “mirror for princes” literature in the 
Islamicate world. This literature brings into focus an attempt on the part of medieval Muslims to 
 





formulate the essentials of statecraft in a time of political unease.68 This literature puts forth a 
public enunciation of power and authority. It puts forth, alongside this enunciation, a political 
ethics rooted in the concept of justice (adl), the antonym of which is oppression and tyranny. The 
idea of justice articulated in the “mirror for princes” literature finds succinct expression in the 
idea of the “circle of justice.”  The “circle of justice” reads as follows: 
The world is a garden, and the fence of it is the dynasty.  
The dynasty is authority, and through it customs are kept alive; 
The customs are a way of governing, which is implemented by the sovereign; 
The sovereign is a shepherd, and the soldiers help him; 
The soldiers are helpers, and money provides for them; 
Money is livelihood, that the flock gather; 
The flock are slaves, devoted to the service of justice; 
Justice is a norm; and it is alive in the world; 
The world is a garden...69 
 
In this vision, justice is propped up by political authority, military power and money. Laws and 
customs make up the essence of justice. However, the sphere of justice requires support from 
other spheres: army and economy. Stated otherwise, the enforcement of laws and customs 
depends on a well-functioning army and economy.  
The emphasis in the “mirror for princes” literature falls upon the prudence of the ruler. 
This emphasis on leadership may at first sight make this literature appear close to al-Fārābī’s 
political thinking. This appearance, however, would be misleading, in my view. The “mirror for 
princes” literature places the premium on the efficacy of the ruler in securing obedience. The 
ruler, this literature suggests, must ensure the devotion of his subjects to their essential tasks—
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war-making for the soldiers and money-making for the subjects or the “flock.” Customs and laws 
are described as a “way of governing.” Little attention is paid to what are some key concerns in 
Al-Fārābī: moral education, character-building and the internalization of laws by the people. The 
key political task appears to be social control, not virtue. 
For a final comparison, let us consider how Al-Fārābī’s views on religion and politics 
stand in respect to the tradition of civil religion in Western political thought. In Section III, we 
have seen that al-Fārābī asserts the preeminence of political science over religious jurisprudence. 
One may take this to resemble the approach of civil religion. Developed in early modern Europe 
amid religious wars, civil religion refers to the attempt to harness the energies and sensibilities 
generated and unleashed by religion toward socially beneficial purposes.70 Civil religionists are 
aware of the dangers posed by religious enthusiasm. However, they understand that religion is 
too deeply entrenched in human psychology and culture to be simply dismissed. Consequently, 
they choose to seize the politico-theological initiative to shape religion to a philosophically and 
civically desirable form. Does al-Fārābī adopt a similar approach when he envisages a regime 
ruled by the king of traditional law? Is the king of traditional law in al-Fārābī’s system tasked 
with the domestication of milla, to use again the concept of al-Fārābī, and the creation, thereby, 
of what we can deem a civil religion in the terms of Western political thought? 
Much scholarship on al-Fārābī, in fact, is divided along this set of questions. Many 
interpreters of al-Fārābī argue that al-Fārābī pursues the strategy of accommodation with respect 
to Islam. Al-Fārābī accommodates Islam to his philosophical system, these interpreters argue, to 
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be able to communicate with the masses that lack philosophical skills.71 It does so also to 
preserve philosophical inquiry from the charge of heresy. Other interpreters argue for the logic of 
convergence instead of the logic of accommodation.72 They suggest that philosophy and Islam 
represent for al-Fārābī two different ways of arriving at the same set of truths. These two ways 
converge on the same system, in other words. The logic of accommodation resembles the 
approach of civil religion. The logic of convergence, in turn, finds the harmony between religion 
and philosophy within easy reach, rendering the need for an aggressive domestication of religion 
relatively redundant.  
I want to approach this set of questions somewhat differently. I want to suggest that the 
logic of accommodation/civil religion fails to capture al-Fārābī’s approach. As for the logic of 
convergence, while it is closer to my position, it too does not quite allow us to appreciate the 
complexity of the matter. Let me elaborate.  
In asserting the primacy of politics over (religious) jurisprudence, al-Fārābī, in my view, 
draws attention to the Context of milla or divine revelation. My use of the word “Context” with a 
capital C is inspired by Shahab Ahmed’s articulation of the hermeneutics of Islam around the 
concepts of the Text, Pre-Text and Con-Text.73 The Con-Text of Revelation comprises the 
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conditions and meanings which render the Text of Revelation intelligible and potent, not only at 
the time of its origin but through all time. The Pre-Text refers to non-textual or natural 
manifestations of the same Divine Intelligence that generates the Text. Jurists or scholars of law 
infer God’s purposes from the Text. This, however, is not the only interpretative strategy 
available to Muslims. Rulers, in much Islamic philosophical-political theory including the 
philosophical-political theory of al-Fārābī, can reverse the interpretative trajectory of jurists 
when they make law, Ahmed suggests: “the ruler’s law-making operation proceeds in a 
trajectory of reading God’s purposes out of the world (including the Unseen world) into Textual 
sources.”74 The ruler proceeds from the Pre-Text to the Text, in contrast to the jurists or scholars 
of Islamic law. The Con-Text forms the bridge that takes the ruler from the world/Pre-Text to the 
Text. Ahmed articulates this as follows: 
The discourse of philosophical-political theory that is present as part of the Con-text of 
Revelation—that is, as part of the apparatus of meanings with which the concept of 
Revelation is historically engaged, and from which Revelation is made meaningful—
charges the ruler with the responsibility to make new law in the interests of the 
welfare/maslalah of the time: that is, in the interest of the welfare of the people of the 
time.75    
 
Ahmed thus posits the welfare of people/maslalah as part of the Con-text of Revelation in 
Islamic philosophical-political theory. When the ruler makes a law in the interest of the people, 
that law engages and confers meaning to the Text/Revelation. When the ruler intervenes into the 
world by legislation, he discloses and contributes to the understanding of the (spirit of the) Text.  
Note well that Al-Fārābī attributes, in the manner suggested by Ahmed, to the king of the 
traditional law the authority and responsibility to change the existing law/make new law in the 
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interest of the welfare/maslalah of his time and people. The interpretive authority al-Fārābī 
attributes to the ruler as part of his political philosophy centered on the concept of 
welfare/maslalah resembles the bridge—the Con-Text— which, Ahmed thinks, allows the 
interpreter to move across the Pre-Text and Text.  The most compelling evidence of this 
commitment to welfare/maslalah is found in the analogy al-Fārābī often makes between the 
statesman and the physician. Consider the following passage as one example of many instances 
in which this analogy is made: 
Just as the health of the body is an equilibrium of its temperament and its sickness is a 
deviation from equilibrium, so too, are the health of the city and its uprightness an 
equilibrium of the moral habits of its inhabitants and its sickness a disparity found in their 
moral habits. When the body deviates from equilibrium in its temperament, the one who 
brings it back to equilibrium and preserves it there is the physician. So, too, when the city 
deviates from equilibrium with respect to the moral habits of its inhabitants, the one who 
brings it back to uprightness and preserves it there is the statesman.76 
 
As there is an equilibrium that obtains in the healthy human body, in this vision, there is an 
equilibrium in a well-functioning city, to recall once again the functionalism of al-Fārābī that I 
elaborated in Section I. The equilibrium of a well-functioning city refers to the overall welfare of 
its inhabitants: one can speak of the welfare of a city as comparable to a sound and healthy body 
with all its parts in order. Civic equilibrium is sustained by the moral habits of upright citizens. 
To preserve civic equilibrium for a regime organized around traditional law (the sunna of a given 
milla), the statesman or the king would need to reach beyond Text toward Con-Text. He would 
need to identify the problems that beset his polity and menace the welfare of his people. Only 
after this identification would he return to the textual sources. The prescription of the statesman 
would determine and rectify the specific predicament upsetting civic equilibrium.                                                                                                                                                                                
 




In knitting together the concepts of equilibrium/welfare and law-making/rulership, Al-
Fārābī initiates in Islamic philosophical political theory a fertile tradition of thought. Notably, the 
13th century Persian polymath, political thinker and advisor to the Abbasid court Nasir al-Din 
Tusi (d. 1201-1274) cites al-Fārābī as the main inspiration for his influential political theory.77 
Tusi defines politics succinctly: “politics is the study of universal laws producing the best 
interest of the generality in as much as they are directed, through cooperation, to true 
perfection.”78 This definition posits “the best interest of the generality” as the purpose of 
universal laws. Further, it emphasizes cooperation between humans, induced and secured 
through laws, as essential to human perfection. These universal laws are given by someone 
“distinguished from others by divine support,” Tusi writes.79 “In the terminology of the 
ancients,” he adds, “[this person] was called the Possessor of the Law, and his enactments the 
Divine Law; the Moderns refer to him as the Religious Lawgiver, and to his enactments as the 
Religious Law.” Tusi, like al-Fārābī, stresses the affinity between ancient and Islamic 
approaches to political thinking, casting the difference between them as a matter of terminology. 
The common denominator between the two approaches becomes the desire to ensure the welfare 
of human associations through the enactment of laws.  
Like al-Fārābī, Tusi recognizes that lawgivers do not emerge in every historical epoch. 
He writes that “not every age and generation has need of a Possessor of the Law, for one 
enactment suffices for the people of many periods.”80 However, “the world does require a 
Regulator in every age, for if management ceases, order is taken away likewise, and the survival 
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of the species in the most perfect manner cannot be realized,” he notes.81 The “Regulator” here 
corresponds to al-Fārābī’s “king of the traditional law.” The Regulator ensures that enacted laws 
and social order are preserved. Note well that Tusi, like al-Fārābī, sets before the lawgiver or the 
ruler goals of the survival and perfection of the human species. Laws originate from divine 
inspiration, to be sure. However, the instrumental value of laws is not to be dismissed, Tusi, like 
al-Fārābī, believes. Laws ultimately prove their worth by the benefits they confer on the human 
species. 
CONCLUSION: CHARTING A PATH FORWARD 
What is, in conclusion, al-Fārābī’s political teaching? What is, furthermore, al-Fārābī’s 
way of navigating the conflict between religion and politics? Al-Fārābī primarily seeks to secure 
the welfare and stability of the umma. In the absence of the “true king” or the ruler of the 
excellent city, traditional laws (sharīʿa) become the key instruments through which welfare and 
stability may be pursued. The statesman or the king of traditional law, then, must situate himself 
in the terms set by the milla that he inherits. However, given the dangers posed by misguided 
zealous appropriations of milla, the statesman must adopt the universal laws of political science 
and organize the umma around these laws. Traditional laws should be modified as demanded by 
the changing times and circumstances. Al-Fārābī explains the origin of milla in naturalized 
terms, in my view, partly because he endorses the malleability of religious laws. Religious laws 
emerge in time. They emerge in history, out of suitable conditions. They can change, therefore, 
as history unfolds. All this points to a common civic realm in which both religion/milla and 
politics take part in a historically dynamic fashion. This common civic realm is anchored in truth 
 




or philosophical knowledge, of which religion/milla is an expression or imitation. It is a mistake 
to understand the political realm as a realm severed from truth and marked by the claims of 
group-feeling, honor or domination. It is also a mistake to deprive the political realm of potential 
contributions from religion, provided that these contributions are philosophically guided and 
imaginatively potent.  
If we read Al-Fārābī carefully, then, we become better situated to avoid these mistakes 
and chart an appealing path forward for the Islamic world. We become better situated to avoid 
the secularist fallacy to think one can protect the state from the religion of its own citizens 
without alienating those citizens. At the same time, we become better situated to avoid the 
Islamist fallacy to think of religious laws as resolutely static and immune from civic questioning 
and critique. Responsible and prudent political leadership, we can appreciate, can bring about 
legislation addressing both the concerns of traditional (Islamic) law and public welfare. In the 
contemporary world, responsible and prudent political leadership takes a democratic form: 
inclusive citizenship, political representation and judicial oversight accompany executive power.  
Lacking the terms of this contemporary language, Al-Fārābī’s political thought should perhaps 
be modified and expanded in the light of these modern developments. However, even as it is, it 
remains a fertile resource for fashioning the future governance of Muslim countries, especially 
with regard to the religious/secular divide that besets them.     
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